



Whatever the result of the Catalan elections, both Catalonia and
Spain are now entering uncharted territory
Catalonia will hold parliamentary elections on 27 September, with the vote being framed by several
Catalan parties as a de facto poll on Catalan independence. Karlo Basta writes that regardless of
whether these parties gain a majority in the election, both Catalonia and Spain are now entering
uncharted territory. He notes that unlike other independence movements, such as those in Canada
and Scotland, there would be no consent from the Spanish government as to how secession could
take place; yet the situation is also radically different from other cases of a territory declaring
unilateral independence from a larger state due to the relative stability of the country and the
absence of political violence.
In the autumn of 2013, I spoke to a member of the Yes Scotland campaign about the then upcoming referendum on
Scottish independence. At one point, I allowed myself the deliberate indiscretion of comparing the Scottish case to
Catalonia, Quebec, and Slovenia. His reaction was immediate and forceful: ‘Scotland is different’.
This insistence on Scottish uniqueness had sound political logic behind it. Building symbolic bridges with other
independence movements was risky. It could have antagonised Canada, Spain, and other cou ntries whose
recognition Scotland would need in case of a ‘yes’ vote. But as political analysis, the assessment was wrong.
Scotland’s march to independence was in fundamental ways not as exceptional as was claimed. That evaluation is
more appropriate to Catalonia and Spain today.
Catalonia and Spain: a special case
The political dynamic surrounding the Catalan nationalists’ push for independence is unprecedented. It is qualitatively
different from the processes in other democratic, developed states with active independence movements. The central
governments of Canada and the United Kingdom accepted secessionist referenda in Quebec and Scotland, whereas
Madrid steadfastly refuses to concede on this point. In fact, consensual secession (with or without a referendum) took
place in states that were both less developed and less institutionally stable than Spain is today (Czechoslovakia and
Serbia-Montenegro come to mind).
The stubborn and mutually exclusive positions of the Spanish government and Catalan nationalists on the subject of
the referendum produced the current possibility of unilateral secession. This puts Spain and Catalonia in a different
category of countries, those with which few Catalans and Spaniards would like to identify. The main reason for this is
that most attempts at unilateral secession result in at least some degree of violence.
But Spain – and Catalonia alongside it – is even more different from these cases than it is from Canada and the UK.
For one thing, it is a solidly middle-class, wealthy society, despite the economic battering of the past seven years. For
another, it is a democracy with a deeply internalised commitment to the rule of law, exceptions notwithstanding.
Equally importantly, Spain is tightly integrated into the EU and NATO. These kinds of countries do not have a
tendency of descending into widespread chaos during significant political crises.
Mapping the unknown
Guessing the future of complex processes is the equivalent of sailing with a poorly drafted map and an occasionally
malfunctioning compass, even at the best of times. Given the singular character of the Catalan situation, forecasting
is more problematic still. But, if navigare necesse est, few choices remain but to try.
Protesters in support of Catalan independence carrying the effigy of Artur
Mas, the President of the Generalitat of Catalonia
If Together for Yes (Junts pel Sí), the coalition of
Catalan parties standing for independence in the
upcoming Catalan elections on 27 September,
receives a majority mandate, the political outcome will
depend on the strength of nerves in Madrid and
Barcelona. Commitments of both sides point to some
type of a political showdown. In these kinds of
circumstances, it is difficult to distinguish between a
bluff and serious intention: Will Madrid really suspend
Catalonia’s autonomy? If so, how will it implement
this? If it doesn’t, and it tries to annul the new laws in
preparation for secession, will Catalonia really declare
independence immediately? Who will be on the
borders between Catalonia and France in that
scenario? Again, stable democratic countries don’t
easily collapse into instability, but when two political
wills start to clash over sinews of state power,
unpredictable outcomes become more likely.
If Spain blinks first, but remains hostile to Catalonia’s
independence, it will be in a position to exercise
significant leverage. The profound aversion of the
international community to unilateral border changes is
built into its DNA. This makes independence difficult to
achieve even where key powers favour the seceding side. In the case of Kosovo, the sympathies of the US State
Department did not prevent years of diplomatic wrangling, and even then, recognition remained far from universal.
Unlike Serbia in the 2000s, Spain has a good international reputation and is a key member of the European Union
and the Eurozone. If it wanted to, Madrid could make it very difficult for Catalonia to normalise its relations with the
outside world, though this would be costly for Spain as well.
If Junts pel Sí does not manage a convincing majority, this kind of outcome could be counted as the equivalent of a
near-miss in an independence referendum. What that would mean for Spanish and Catalan politics beyond 2015
would be equally uncertain. In hindsight, the 1995 Quebec referendum was a culmination of secessionist politics in
that province. The sovereigntist sentiment gradually receded, and a repeated vote on the province’s future status
never became a politically relevant option. While it would be unwise to proclaim the death of Québécois separatism,
it is certainly in deep hibernation.
But by 1995, Quebec had already won most of the substantive, if not symbolic, concessions that Catalonia is still
pursuing. What is more, in some ways, the referendum was the swan song for an entire generation of Quebecker
nationalists whose formative years corresponded with the surge of the secessionist movement in the late 1960s and
the 1970s. Younger Quebeckers do not share the grievances that led so many of their parents to support
independence. In Catalonia, by comparison, the secessionists are only coming into their own. Some of the activists
that pushed the ERC and CDC toward more openly secessionist positions, especially since 2006, are now entering
their political prime. And their grievances, exacerbated by the prolonged economic crisis, are still very much alive.
In the short term – assuming Junts pel Sí falls short of a majority – the relationship between Spain and Catalonia will
depend on the results of the Spanish election and the government that will form thereafter. In the long term, the failed
divorce will likely give way to a very awkward marriage.
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